US judge finds NSO Group liable for hacking journalists via WhatsApp
476 points
by o999
1 day ago
| 14 comments
| reuters.com
| HN
kdbg
7 hours ago
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I'm not a lawyer so maybe I'm misunderstanding something but the plaintiff is Whatsapp, not the journalists. This isn't really about holding NSO Group accountable for hacking journalists at all

The fact journalists were compromised seems only incidental, the ruling is about weather or not NGO Group "exceeded authorization" on WhatsApp by sending the Pegasus installation vector through WhatsApp to the victims and not weather they were unauthorized in accessing the victims. Its a bit of a subtle nuance but I think its important.

Quoting the judgement itself:

> The court reasoned that, because all Whatsapp users are authorized to send messages, defendants did not act without authorization by sending their messages, even though the messages contained spyware. Instead, the court held that the complaint’s allegations supported only an "exceeds authorization" theory.

> The nub of the fight here is semantic. Essentially, the issue is whether sending the Pegasus installation vector actually did exceed authorized access. Defendants argue that it passed through the Whatsapp servers just like any other message would, and that any information that was 'obtained' was obtained from the target users' devices (i.e., their cell phones), rather than from the Whatapp servers themselves

> [...removing more detailed defendant argument...]

> For their part, plaintiffs point to section (a)(2) itself, which imposes liability on whoever "accesses a computer" in excess of authorized access, and "thereby obtains information from any protected computer" pointing to the word "any"

> [...]

> As the parties clarified at the hearing, while the WIS does obtain information directly from the target users’ devices, it also obtains information about the target users' device via Whatsapp servers.

Adding a little more detail that comes from the prior dockets and isn't in the judgement directly but basically NSO Group scripted up a fake Whatsapp client that could send messages that the original application wouldn't be able to send. They use this fake client to send some messages that the original application wouldn't be able to send which provide information about the target users' device. In that the fake client is doing something the real client cannot do (and fake clients are prohibited by the terms) they exceeded authorization.

Think about that for a moment and what that can mean. I doubt I'm the only person here who has ever made an alternative client for something before. Whatapp (that I recall) does not claim that the fake client abused any vulnerabilities to get information just that it was a fake client and that was sufficient. Though I should note that there were some redacted parts in this area that could be relevant.

I dunno, I mean the CFAA is a pretty vague law that has had these very broad applications in the past so I'm not actually surprised I was just kinda hopeful to see that rolled back a bit after the Van Bruen case a few years ago and the supreme court had some minor push back against the broad interpretations that allowed ToS violations to become CFAA violations.

Edit: Adding a link to the judgement for anyone interested: https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.cand.35...

Edit2: And CourtListener if you want to read the other dockets that include the arguments from both sides (with redactions) https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/16395340/facebook-inc-v...

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sangnoir
5 hours ago
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> I doubt I'm the only person here who has ever made an alternative client for something before.

I've been on both sides of the issue by authoring unofficial clients, and battling abusive unofficial clients to services I run. The truth is, complete carte blanche for either side is untenable. 99.99% of well-behaved clients are tacitly ignored, I'm not against those that deliver malware, or bypass rate-limiting having their day in court.

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8note
3 hours ago
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i dont think users of whatsapp would have standing against people hacking whatsapp to get their data.

whatsapp owns the systems, so its up to whatsapp to sue

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EMIRELADERO
1 hour ago
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What?

So if someone robs a bank and empties my safety deposit box I can't sue them because it was the bank that had the money, not me?

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unyttigfjelltol
37 minutes ago
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If someone steals the ownership registry the bank maintains regarding the deposit boxes-- may be the better analogy. Or list of the owner and box number. Clearly this is information the bank controls, not the individual.
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madeofpalk
2 hours ago
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> fake client to send some messages that the original application wouldn't be able to send which provide information about the target users' device

> I doubt I'm the only person here who has ever made an alternative client for something before

I think the distinction here for "exceeds authorisation" is pretty apparent. I don't read this judgement as being damning for people wanting to make their own clients.

They made a third party client for deliberately malicious purposes. If you go ahead and make a discord client with the intention of spamming or otherwise causing harm to its users, I think it's completely reasonable for you to get in trouble for that.

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ganoushoreilly
5 hours ago
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THE CFAA is definitely ripe for reform. It wouldn't be hard to argue it's broad and vague. There's definitely this overarching sweep of online behaviors that could easily be classified as benign.
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sweeter
4 hours ago
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Darknet Diaries did a few podcast episodes on the NSO group from the perspective of people who have directly interacted with or have been the target and it really puts it into perspective how horrific they are. They operate under the protection of the US and are directly allowed to spy on US citizens without any recourse whatsoever.

One particularly grotesque case was the illegal wire tapping of Ben Suda after launching a criminal probe in to Israeli war crimes, which they used to threaten the prosecutor and used it to hide evidence that they knew was under scrutiny or take the cases to court just to drop it so they can tell the ICC that they did make an attempt to prosecute, which is a loophole that disallows the ICC to take up those cases.

I'm certain many countries do this stuff, as well as operate botnets and threaten journalists... but the uniqueness here is that these intel groups located in Israel operate under complete protection of the US without any scrutiny or oversight alongside the US government. We are living in this dystopian universe that people have warned about, for decades at this point.

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tptacek
4 hours ago
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The US hosts and protects firms that are better at this than NSO, and not just because they're smart enough not to be in the news.
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stavros
29 minutes ago
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Why was this dead? If anything, Thomas' reputation here should at least entitle him to being heard.
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theptip
28 minutes ago
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Agreed that the flag seems highly dubious here.
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WatchDog
2 hours ago
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Do these firms target US citizens without a US warrant?
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dghlsakjg
1 hour ago
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You don’t need a warrant to target US citizens unless you are the government.
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MaxPock
5 minutes ago
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The arrangement is that UKs GCHQ spies on US citizens and shares the info with CIA/NSA .
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tptacek
1 hour ago
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US citizens are routinely targeted by CNE operations enabled by commercial tools, yes.
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hammock
2 hours ago
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Who are you talking about?
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bbqfog
1 hour ago
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I refuse to use Israeli tech in my stack if at all possible. I don't see how someone could use software like Snyk and not put themselves at risk (founders are ex-IDF Unit 8200). Especially in the area of security, it seems like using Israeli tech is inviting the wolf straight into the hen house. No thanks.
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FpUser
4 hours ago
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Treating NSO owners / decision makers the same way as Gary McKinnon would be more appropriate. But I guess they are more "equal".
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ilrwbwrkhv
17 hours ago
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I thought Whatsapp and signal share the same encryption
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upofadown
3 hours ago
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It was a buffer overflow in a VOIP stack:

* https://www.theverge.com/2019/5/14/18622744/whatsapp-spyware...

Interestingly enough, Signal (and others) had the same sort of vulnerability on Android from a WebRTC stack:

* https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2020/08/exploiting-an...

The big issue in both cases is that the exploit was triggered before the user answered the call.

I think the moral here is that a secure messenger should not execute inherently insecure code (i.e.complex code) on behalf of entities that are not really well trusted by the user. The default should be always plain text.

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xvector
2 hours ago
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The other moral here is to stop using memory unsafe languages. It's just so incredibly dumb that we keep making excuses for this.
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mjg59
17 hours ago
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The encryption isn't alleged to have been compromised. The app itself deals with a lot of untrusted input (eg, thumbnailing video files you've been sent) so there's a meaningful attack surface outside the protocol itself.
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ruined
5 hours ago
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note for signal users: in settings, you can disable link previews and automatic media download.
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stavros
26 minutes ago
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Why are link previews a problem? Presumably I only generate previews for links I've vetted.
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NolF
17 hours ago
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The group exploited a bug in WhatsApp to deliver the spyware. It wasn't an E2E issue.

> A U.S. judge ruled on Friday in favor of Meta Platforms' (META.O), opens new tab WhatsApp in a lawsuit accusing Israel's NSO Group of exploiting a bug in the messaging app to install spy software allowing unauthorized surveillance.

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bawolff
17 hours ago
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The attack wasn't targeting the encryption part of whatsapp (afaik).

Encryption is important but it often is not the weakest link in the security chain.

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kjkjadksj
9 hours ago
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People have to start assuming that any communication method in use is compromised. There’s just no way on earth orgs like the NSA would throw their hands up in the air and not find multiple different avenues into an app like signal. Its one of the most downloaded messaging apps. Investment into compromising it is very worth while. People should just assume everything involving a cell phone or computer is inherently insecure. Meanwhile for some analog methods (one time pads, even cupping a hand and whispering into anothers ear, etc), the power balance isn’t so lopsided between the state and the individual as it is with digital communications where everything is probably compromised in some way by now.
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WeylandYutani
55 minutes ago
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Well no Chinese should be using software that involved Americans. That is just common sense. When the chips are down everyone gets drafted by their country's security apparatus.
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eastbound
5 hours ago
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Password managers are such a high target that I wonder how we’ve convinced people to put all their passwords in the same software.
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dghlsakjg
1 hour ago
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Depends on your threats.

I’m more worried about financial scams than I am anything related to government. Password managers with random passwords are an excellent guard against that threat.

If I were worried about state actor threats, any keys or passwords would be memorized.

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aucisson_masque
3 hours ago
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Back to using the same password everywhere then.

Bitwarden is already a big step up from what most people are doing, then if you want to hide from gouvernement you better make sure you save your password on extremely secured device. But that's another treat level from the average Joe.

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dmantis
17 hours ago
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There should be no difference with usual botnet owner/ransomware gangs and such companies. Management should go to prison for good 20-30 years for that and being extradited worldwide. Considering that ransomware gangs are probably less harmful to the society than guys who hack journalists and politicians, putting their lifes at literal risks, not just their pockets.

There should be no "legal" hacking of someone's devices apart from extraction of data from already convicted people in public court with the right to defend themselves

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bawolff
17 hours ago
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Its not like this is that different than traditional "weapons" (i hate the "cyberweapons" analogy, but if the shoe fits).

Sell guns to governments, even unsavoury ones, it is very rare anything will happen to you except in pretty extreme cases. Sell guns to street gangs, well that is a different story. Like i don't think this situation is different because it is "hacking".

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onedognight
14 hours ago
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The NSO created/ran cloud instances for each client country and reviewed and approved every target. The didn’t sell weapons like in your analogy. They were effectively assassins for hire.

The problem with selling exploits is you want to maintain “ownership” of the exploit details, lest your customer just take the exploit and sell/use it without paying more or use it to attack you or your friends. This means you end up with veto power. I.e. culpability.

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monkeyfun
5 hours ago
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And meanwhile, if the government sells guns to cartels... no big deal. Rarely throw a fall guy under the bus. Or often not even that.

Trying to remember the quote I last heard, something to the tune of "we don't want to punish, we want to educate", which was about "educating" LEOs and entire police departments they shouldn't be selling fun switch guns illegally to gangs and private buyers.

(And do I even have to mention "fast and furious?" Hah! Feds get it the easiest.)

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Neonlicht
14 hours ago
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All the cartels in Mexico buy their guns from America and nobody is going to jail over it.
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lupusreal
13 hours ago
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People do in fact get sent to prison for that, straw purchases are a federal felony. Not all of them actually get caught, which is true of any crime.
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oaththrowaway
12 hours ago
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Except when the ATF does it, no big deal
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buo
8 hours ago
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ilbeeper
14 hours ago
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I agree with the first part, at least in spirit.

The second part though doesn't make sense. If the US president can send drones to kill terrorists without taking them to court, surely he can order hacking their phones. If you think that there's no case where the latter is ok you shouldn't you fight against the former first?

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ignoramous
13 hours ago
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> send drones to kill terrorists

The part that you miss is, are they only killing "terrorists" extrajudicially? To take that propaganda at its face value is to ask, what else could they be killing brown people for, if not terrorism?

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ilbeeper
11 hours ago
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I didn't say if I think that drone killing is justified or not, since I have no opinion on that - I don't know enough to form an opinion. I only say that since the government have the right to send killing drone it doesn't make sense to raise pitchforks against phone hacking
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MomsAVoxell
7 hours ago
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The thing is, extrajudicial murder justified by labeling the victim “terrorist” is illegal and should not be accepted in a free and open society.

The ‘terrorist’ label was invented as a means of abrogating human rights by governments who felt they were encumbered by the obligation to protect human rights. “Terrorist” labeling is a totalitarian-authoritarian apparatus to avoid culpability for its actions when a government decides the easiest solution to its problem is outright murder.

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SahAssar
1 hour ago
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Do you not think that terrorism exists, that the label has been co-opted for other purposes, that terrorists cannot be treated as combatants, that non-declared-war conflicts should not have deliberate strikes or something else?

It seems to me like terrorism has a pretty plain definition: Using violence against civilians/non-combatants to further a ideological goal, primarily via fear.

It's often misused as an excuse, but there are actual terrorists, the word has a meaning and we should not let it be watered down by either the people wanting to use it as an excuse or the people trying to shroud terrorism in something else.

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joebob42
2 hours ago
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I don't get what's happening in this thread. This is a pretty clear statement: hacking isn't worse than the killing that the government is already allowed to do. It's a pretty straightforward argument which for some reason seems to be being misunderstood.

I'll gently push on the premise though: hacking isn't worse for the victims than death, obviously, but I think it's possible weaponizing of exploits does more total damage. Both collateral, due to the manufacturing of exploits which ultimately leak and harm a bunch of unrelated actors, and because the marginal hacking is lower cost, practically and politically. So a given attack is likely to be used against groups we'd recognize less clearly as "terrorists" / deserving of the harm / etc.

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ignoramous
11 hours ago
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> I have no opinion ... I don't know enough to form an opinion.

Why speak in hypotheticals supporting some phantom opinion? Concern trolling is even worse.

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ilbeeper
10 hours ago
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It is not hypothetical, the fact is that killing drones are used in practice, and it just doesn't make sense to oppose lesser measures that are being used without judgement when killing is allowed.
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ignoramous
9 hours ago
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> killing is allowed

You said it is okay / allowed because "terrorists". Otherwise, it is a heinous crime. Just like the Pegasus one.

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ilbeeper
9 hours ago
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I have no idea what you are talking about. Ok is a value judgment which I didn't state. Allowed is a fact. Are you arguing with what I'm saying or with an opponent in your mind?
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ignoramous
9 hours ago
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> I have no idea ...

This is what you wrote:

  "The second part though doesn't make sense."
The second part being:

  If the US president can send drones to kill terrorists without taking them to court, surely he can order hacking their phones. If you think that there's no case where the latter is ok you shouldn't you fight against the former first?"
Pretty clear from your rhetoric what your position is. Folks here are not dumb.

> Ok is a value judgment ... Allowed is a fact

Factually, genocidaries are worse than terrorists.

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tehwebguy
15 hours ago
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Certainly the ones that hack journalists should go to prison.
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MomsAVoxell
7 hours ago
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Anyone can be a journalist, so the requirement should be that all of us have our human rights protected by criminalizing this heinous behavior.
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lifestyleguru
14 hours ago
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Why should journalist badge provide some kind of protection shield? [1]

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pablo_Gonz%C3%A1lez_Yag%C3%BCe

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talldayo
11 hours ago
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In Israel's opinion? It shouldn't: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_journalists_killed_in_...

Israeli forces killed 38x more journalists than Hamas did on October 7th.

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squarefoot
3 hours ago
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Also by now the number of people killed in Gaza by Netanyahu is very close to the number of Ukrainian people killed by Putin. Did anyone suggest sanctions against Israel for that genocide? Nope, they enjoy their full immunity and keep going forward with a massacre that has the same exact motivation as the Russian invasion: rob other people of their territory and resources. Two war criminals, two rogue terrorist states, yet two completely different weights.
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o999
13 hours ago
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Imagine if they chase NSO as hard as they chased Wikileaks
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cyanydeez
5 hours ago
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Unfortunately, incorporation is how you whitewash normal criminal culpability to just a cost of doing business fine.

Capitalism is neat that way. Diffusion of responsibility.

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nico
20 hours ago
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> "Surveillance companies should be on notice that illegal spying will not be tolerated."

That is kinda funny, although sad at the same time

On the flip side, I guess that means META allows WhatsApp users being only “legally spied” on

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trogdor
11 hours ago
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Every social media company allows legal spying. Warrants and wiretap orders are issued every day in the United States.
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sangnoir
5 hours ago
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With end-user-device-controlled e2ee, the only information available to law enforcement is metadata. With a warrant, they could seize your device (or the backups, if unencrypted)
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dsp
5 hours ago
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Unfortunately, I don’t think end-to-end encryption guarantees much when it comes to legal intercept in proprietary messaging apps. The intercept functionality could be done in the client and capture data, not just metadata.
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sangnoir
2 hours ago
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Why hasn't any evidence of such client-side interception ever been surfaced? Reversing apps and software has been done since forever, and has been used to discover things the app-makers don't want made public - such as unannounced new products, but this happens perennialy with Apple & OS updates, and upcoming features in apps that are behind flags.
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tredre3
54 minutes ago
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> Why hasn't any evidence of such client-side interception ever been surfaced?

In such scenario only the target of the wiretap would receive the modified client application. Both google and apple allow pushing updates to small subset of users. It's not unthinkable that they also have the (internal) ability to push a specific update to a specific user.

But I guess now you'll move the goalpost to ask "Why hasn't any Googler come forward and admitted it's happening?" That is a fair question, but I think most people would see this legal spying as no big deal and perhaps even a good thing.

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dylan604
12 hours ago
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Isn't that obvious though? Meta wants exclusive spying rights to its users. You spying on users with Meta's products is not allowed. If you want to spy on your users, build an app that's so popular billions of people sign up willingly to allow you to spy on them. Have you no decency?
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talldayo
11 hours ago
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> Meta wants exclusive spying rights

You're allowed to say "The NSA", we're all adults here. No need to speak in euphemisms.

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throwaway290
14 hours ago
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"Unauthorized hostility against pioneer detected"
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akira2501
20 hours ago
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Which is ironic considering the FBI and CISA just today announced that you _should_ use WhatsApp and not use SMS for two factor authentication. Although they point out the biggest problem is mobile users click on links in SMS. We live in a mostly captured and anti consumer environment. I'm not sure there's any great advice.

https://www.newsnationnow.com/business/tech/fbi-warns-agains...

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magic_hamster
19 hours ago
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Of course there is. Always prefer an authenticator app over SMS. Also, Passkeys are supposed to be a big upgrade in this regard.
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bawolff
17 hours ago
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Whatsapp is not still vulnerable to the hack (as far as we know) and SMS applications have had similar vulnerabilities in the past.
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wslh
13 hours ago
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There are many other companies beyond NSO Group, if I were a journalist I would write a more comprehensive list of them and educate about this whole "industry".
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MomsAVoxell
7 hours ago
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Very few companies’ work results in outright murder of the targeted victims.

If you know of any other cyber criminal organizations like the NSO, where governments use their tools to select and murder targets, please describe them.

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tptacek
5 hours ago
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The previous commenter's point is that NSO is simply the firm in this space that you happened to have heard of. There are many more.
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talldayo
11 hours ago
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NSO Group is unique in that they are entirely sheltered from (largely due) criticism by their government, creating an unaccountable and injust basis of relations between the United States and Israel that many readers are concerned by. There simply aren't any other comparably corrupt "cybersecurity" outfits in the world.

Kinda similar to how the IDF has never been charged with war crimes despite several of their service-members being recorded breaking the law in their Israeli fatigues. It's not that international law was never broken, it's that Israel considers themselves above the rule of law and international bases of morality. That type of behavior absolutely must be called out in it's lonesome, such that no nation ever repeats Israel's embarrassing mistake.

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hammock
2 hours ago
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Can you share some?
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kotaKat
10 hours ago
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Like Verint, who tried to buy the NSO group, and has security DVRs in Walmarts all over the world...
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Barrin92
4 hours ago
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this is a really good source: https://www.surveillancewatch.io/
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ThinkBeat
4 hours ago
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It is hard to believe that NSO group is allowed to operate. They sell technology to horrible places, they cause death torture, and a host of less horrible things.

Yet they are protected by the US and Israel, which I believe is the case that they have backdoors into all of it, and getting the targets to actually install this malware on their own saves a lot time.

All good, except for the actual real world victims.

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bigfatkitten
4 hours ago
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> It is hard to believe that NSO group is allowed to operate. They sell technology to horrible places, they cause death torture, and a host of less horrible things.

That describes the entire Israeli defence industry, and a fair sized portion of Israel's cybersecurity industry, based on the stomach-churning sales pitches I've received.

NSO are not unique, they just got unlucky.

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tptacek
4 hours ago
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It describes the entire defense industry, and a fair sized portion of the cybersecurity industry, full stop.
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EMIRELADERO
3 hours ago
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> based on the stomach-churning sales pitches I've received.

Care to elaborate? This could be news story-worthy

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o999
5 hours ago
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NSO Group: Relationship with the Israeli state

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NSO_Group#Relationship_with_th...

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tptacek
4 hours ago
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This will be the third place on this thread I've made this point, but it's important so I'm going to keep making it.

You know about NSO because they are, relative to the field they operate in, unusually transparent. They have competitors around the world, with varying degrees of coziness with their host countries. The only thing distinctive about NSO is how much you've heard of them.

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prpl
3 hours ago
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I mean, that’s true of most businesses and industries, big and small? The average person has no idea what Oracle or SAP exists, or that they are multibillion dollar companies. Most people don’t know you can just go buy plastic and composites at TAP, and all sorts of things at McMaster. Most people don’t even know who builds commercial vehicles besides like Peterbilt maybe.

Is there an argument you are making that Meta/Apple/Google should be suing all the other companies as well?

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tptacek
3 hours ago
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If they're trespassing on Meta's network, absolutely. The core thing that these companies do though tends not to intersect so directly with Meta's property rights.
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4ad
4 hours ago
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Okay, so? What is your point?
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devcpp
3 hours ago
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What was the point of the parent comment?
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tptacek
4 hours ago
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There is nothing distinctive about NSO's relationship with its host country, and many (most?) other G20 countries have similar relationships. Seemed kind of straightforward from my first comment?
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ls612
3 hours ago
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Usually zero days being used in the wild get found and analyzed. Who else is making exploit packages like this other than state actors?
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tptacek
3 hours ago
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Wow. No. Most weaponized zero-day exploits are not produced by state actors; in fact, even the US, which has the world's most capable CNE apparatus, also buys exploits from private firms.
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ls612
3 hours ago
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What exploit packages in recent years that aren’t NSO haven’t been attributed to an APT?
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tptacek
3 hours ago
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I don't even know how to answer that question; I'd have trouble getting my head around its premise.

Here, how about instead, a podcast episode we did with Mark Dowd:

https://securitycryptographywhatever.com/2024/06/24/mdowd/

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ls612
1 hour ago
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My understanding is that in places like Russia or China they have full blown military units with uniformed officers and men that are developing these sorts of things. In the US a lot of it is (was?) NSA related like EternalBlue. Are you saying in the west now that we are buying exploits from the grey market instead of getting them from NSA researchers? I thought that more broadly the government had been learning its lesson that there is no such thing as a NOBUS vuln and that America has more to lose than our adversaries from these things.
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tptacek
1 hour ago
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You're asking questions Mark Dowd addresses in that podcast. There's a transcript; you don't even have to listen to it.
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CamelCaseName
4 hours ago
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I'm quite surprised by the corporate history section.

Specifically, NSO Group is worth a lot less than I thought it was, even at its peak. ($1B+ valuation)

Also, the amount of infighting is... Surprising perhaps? Less surprising is the number of spinoffs out of it, and the number of competing Israeli spyware groups.

I'm constantly surprised by how good he Israeli startup environment seems to be.

Why is this? How are there so many acquisitions out of there?

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kortilla
4 hours ago
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Things like this are similar to law firms. The shelf life of vulnerabilities means that there isn’t a lot of intellectual property owned by the company. The value is in the people’s skills.

So once people get really good they quickly realize they can make more by starting their own company and siphoning off client relationships.

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tokioyoyo
4 hours ago
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Valuations don’t really matter in their playing field. It’s more about power and politics, rather than raw numbers.
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tptacek
4 hours ago
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You say that because...?
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ghxst
3 hours ago
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I'd imagine they have a very limited market as in who they can sell their products and services to, for reasons that might make political power more interesting than valuation.
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tptacek
3 hours ago
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I don't know about that. Something I think a lot of people sleep on with this stuff is that most countries have multiple security agencies, and you generally cut deals with them individually. The market for this stuff is bigger than it looks.
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ghxst
2 hours ago
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That's probably a fair assumption too.

I was mostly thinking that the customers / clients you have and services you have to offer can be largely dependent by people in positions of power where having the right connections and influence might be the key difference between a service or product being viable.

For example - although not related to NSO - something like operation Trojan Shield required both Australian and Lithuanian cooperation due to fourth amendment interpretations.

Having a zero day in such cases is only part of the work and everything beyond that might be very much dependant on the strings you can pull.

But I can also see the argument that that would be something the government can figure out after they buy the product or service, so maybe I'm wrong on that and it's less important than I thought.

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tptacek
1 hour ago
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My mental model of how this works --- and I have some (imperfect) evidence for it --- is that a given one of these firms (NSO or one of its competitors) has an addressable market of N countries each with an average of K security agencies, and basically all of those agencies pay subscription fees to be continuously in a position to do a CNE operation when they want to.

(Generally, I don't think countries just "buy exploits"; a significant component of the money in this space comes from "maintenance", so much so that I think it makes more sense to think of exploits as subscription services.)

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ghxst
14 minutes ago
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> so much so that I think it makes more sense to think of exploits as subscription services.

I think this makes sense, especially given the uncertainty of when an exploit gets patched.

To my original argument of political power vs valuations you can probably say that having those same people you'd otherwise try to influence on your board with a financial incentive allows you to achieve the same thing, I'm not sure why I didn't consider that before.

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tptacek
7 minutes ago
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Don't get me wrong: I'm sure there's plenty going on between NSO and Israel, and a lot of politics involved. But I also know it to be a real industry, with lots of players.
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dudeinjapan
12 hours ago
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You have to be really bad if Meta are somehow the good guys in the article.
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Bilal_io
9 hours ago
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The victims are the good guys. Meta is just not happy that their platform was exploited. Even if you consider them to be the bad guys, they needed to sue to curtail the bad PR
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jredwards
21 hours ago
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Well, good. But also: build better software.
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mrkeen
17 hours ago
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Ahem we don't do that here. We get to market faster before our runway ends so we don't risk our exit.
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amelius
3 hours ago
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If it's approved by the AppStore, then it should be good, no?
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ChrisMarshallNY
16 hours ago
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I support this.

It’s not possible to be “perfect,” but if we do our best to get there, we’ll make really good stuff.

It’s unlikely to happen, though, as we have a system that explicitly rewards writing crap, because it makes money.

As long as we fail to reward good work, we will continue to get poor work.

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dylan604
12 hours ago
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> As long as we fail to reward good work, we will continue to get poor work.

I think that's a bit off. The problem is that we continue to reward poor work so the poor work continues.

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ChrisMarshallNY
6 hours ago
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That's correct. I was being generous.

Note that even my fairly mild statement was not received well. People really don't like discussion of improving the Quality of software, here. Too much money to be made in not-so-good stuff.

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immibis
19 hours ago
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Didn't the US fund those guys to do exactly that?
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Retr0id
17 hours ago
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The US often does unlawful things.
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dylan604
12 hours ago
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Especially using willing 3rd parties to allow for plausible deniability.
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lrvick
16 hours ago
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It is only legal and ethical when we do it.
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zhengiszen
11 hours ago
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The same people are behind the current genocide against Palestinians in Gaza
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