> The Sanitizer API is a proposed new browser API to bring a safe and easy-to-use capability to sanitize HTML into the web platform [and] is currently being incubated in the Sanitizer API WICG, with the goal of bringing this to the WHATWG.
Which would replace the need for sanitizing user-entered content with libraries like DOMPurify by having it built into the browser's API.
The proposed specification has additional information: https://github.com/WICG/sanitizer-api/
A big part of designing a security-related API is making it really easy and obvious to do the secure thing, and hide the insecure stuff behind a giant "here be dragons" sign. You want people to accidentally do the right thing, so you call your secure and insecure functions "setHTML" and "setUnsafeHTML" instead of "setSanitizedHTML" and "setHTML".
mysql_real_escape_string() was removed in PHP 7.0.
get_magic_quotes_gpc() was removed in PHP 8.0.
https://www.php.net/mysql_real_escape_string
https://www.php.net/get_magic_quotes_gpc
The current minimum PHP version that is supported for security fixes by the PHP community is 8.1: https://www.php.net/supported-versions.php
If you're still seeing this in 2025 (going on 2026), there are other systemic problems at play besides the PHP code.
> HTML parsing is not stable and a line of HTML being parsed and serialized and parsed again may turn into something rather different
Are there any examples where the first approach (sanitize to string and set inner html) is actually dangerous? Because it's pretty much the only thing you can do when sanitizing server-side, which we do a lot.
Edit: I also wonder how one would add for example rel="nofollow noreferrer" to links using this. Some sanitizers have a "post process node" visitor function for this purpose (it already has to traverse the dom tree anyway).
The article links to [0], which has some examples of instances in which HTML parsing is context-sensitive. The exact same string being put into a <div> might be totally fine, while putting it inside a <style> results in XSS.
[0]: https://www.sonarsource.com/blog/mxss-the-vulnerability-hidi...
This is a common and rather tiresome critique of all kinds of blog posts. I think it is fair to assume the reader has a bit of contextual awareness when you publish on your personal blog. Yes, you were linked to it from a place without that context, but it’s readily available on the page, not a secret.
It's not hard to add one line of context so readers aren't lost. Here, take this for example, combining a couple parts of the GitHub readme:
> For those who are unfamiliar, the Sanitizer API is a proposed new browser API being incubated in the Sanitizer API WICG, with the goal of bringing this to the WHATWG.
Easy. Can fit that in right after "this blog post will explain why", and now everyone is on the same page.
Do we have data to back that up? Anecdotally the blogs I have operated over the years tend to mostly sustain on repeat traffic from followers (with occasional bursts of external traffic if something trends on social media)
Here's my anecdotal data. Number of blogs that I personally follow: zero. And yet, somehow, I end up reading a lot of blog posts (mostly linked from HN, but also from other places in my webosphere).
(More than a bit irritated by the "Do you have data to back that up" thing, given that you don't really have data to back up your position).
It wasn't necessarily a request for you personally to provide data. I'm curious if any larger blog operators have insight here.
"person who only reads the 0.001% of blog posts that reach the HN front page" is not terribly interesting as an anecdotal source on blog traffic patterns
It’s also not hard to look around for a few seconds to find that information, is my point.
One word would have fixed the problem. "Why does the Mozilla API blah blah blah.". Perhaps "The Mozilla implementation used to...". Something like that.
THAT is not hard.
Personally, my recommendation in most cases would be "maintain a strict list of common elements/attributes to allow in the serialized form, and don't put anything weird in that list: if a serialize-parse roundtrip has the remote possibility of breaking something, then you're allowing too much". Also, "if you want to mutate something, then do it in the object tree, not in the serialized version".
[0] https://www.sonarsource.com/blog/mxss-the-vulnerability-hidi...
SanitizeHTML functions in JS have had big security holes before, around edge cases like null bytes in values, or what counts as a space in Unicode. Browsers decided to be lenient in what they accept, so that means any serialize-parse chain creates some risk.
The more you allow, the less you know about what might happen. E.g., <svg> styling can very easily create clickjacking attacks. (If I wanted to allow SVGs at all, I'd consider shunting them into <img> tags with data URLs.) So anyone who does want to use these more 'advanced' features in the first place had better know what they're doing.
I'd suggest not sanitizing user-provided HTML on the server. It's totally fine to do if you're fully sanitizing it, but gets a little sketchy when you want to keep certain elements and attributes.
The term to look for is “mutation xss” (or mxss).
The theory is that the parse->serialize->parse round-trip is not idempotent and that sanitization is element context-dependent, so having a pure string->string function opens a new class of vulnerabilities. Having a stateful setHTML() function defined on elements means the HTML context-specific rules for tables, SVG, MathML etc. are baked in, and eliminates double-parsing errors.
Are MXSS errors actually that common?
Seriously, we got CSP before setHTML() WTF!
CSP is nasty. Removing essential functionality to mitigate possible security flaws, ignoring the developer's intent. CSP is like taping your mouth shut to lose weight... But you still sit through 3 meals a day... Basically smashing the food against your face.
Despite the very graphical description, I still don't understand why you don't like CSP. As the server owner, you set your own CSP rules, and if you don't want anything removed, don't configure it like that? It's all opt-in.
Obviously it doesn't fix all classes of potential security issues, but neither would anything else either, it's just one piece of the puzzle.
No, the reason is that the problem is underspecified and unsatisfiable.
The whole notion of HTML "sanitization" is the ultimate "just do what I mean". It's the customer who cannot articulate what they need. It's «Hey, how about if there were some sort of `import "nobugs"`?»
"HTML sanitization" is never going to be solved because it's not solvable.
There's no getting around knowing whether or any arbitrary string is legitimate markup from a trusted source or some untrusted input that needs to be treated like text. This is a hard requirement. (And if you already have this information, then the necessary tools have been available for years—decades, even: `innerHTML` and `textContent`—or if you don't like the latter, then it's trivial to write your own `escapeText` subroutine that's correct, well-formed, and sound.) No new DOMPurify alternative or native API baked into the browser is going to change this, ever.
I think maybe a better api would be to add an unsafe html tag so it would look something like:
<unsafe>
all unsafe code here
</unsafe>
But in any case, you really should be validating everything server side.
You don’t want developers trying to rely on client-only sanitization for user input submitted to the server. Sanitizing while setting a user-face UI makes sense.
Well this is clearly wrong isn't it? You need a whitelist of elements, not a blacklist. That lesson is at least 2 decades old.
That's better than only supporting `removeElements`, but it really shouldn't support it at all.
With `const clean = DOMPurify.sanitize(input); context.innerHTML = clean;` your linter suddenly needs to do complex code analysis and keep track if each variable passed to `context.innerHTML` is clean or tainted.
https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Trusted_Typ...
1. <https://pchiusano.github.io/2014-10-11/defensive-writing.htm...>
Doesn't seem obvious unless your dutch.
Especially as the first things I would think obvious is: if breaking the behaviour of innerHTML is not a concern for your software why keep it at all? Delete the property or make it readonly.
I don't know what that means.
> if breaking the behaviour of innerHTML is not a concern for your software why keep it at all?
For the reason that they said.
This is why people should really use XHTML, the strict XML dialect of HTML, in order to avoid these nasty parsing surprises. It has the predictable behavior that you want.
In XHTML, the code does exactly what it says it does. If you write <table><a></a></table> like the example on the mXSS page, then you get a table element and an anchor child. As another example, if you write <table><td>xyz</td></table>, that's exactly what you get, and there are no implicit <tbody> or <tr> inserted inside.
It's just wild as I continue to watch the world double down for decades on HTML and all its wild behavior in parsing. Furthermore, HTML's syntax is a unique snowflake, whereas XML is a standardized language that just so happens to be used in SVG, MathML, Atom, and other standards - no need to relearn syntax every single time.
It was that decision that resulted in the current mess. Browser vendors could have given us a grace period to fix HTML that didn't validate against the schema. Instead they said "there is no schema"
[0]: I’ve worked with XML schemas a lot and have grown to really dislike them actually but that’s neither here nor there