> How does install.md work with my existing CLI or scripts?

> install.md doesn't replace your existing tools—it works with them. Your install.md can instruct the LLM to run your CLI, execute your scripts, or follow your existing setup process. Think of it as a layer that guides the LLM to use whatever tools you've already built.

(It doesn't X — it Ys. Think of it as a Z that Ws. this is LLM speak! I don't know why they lean on these constructions to the exclusion of all else, but they demonstrably do. The repo README was also committed by Claude Code. As much as I like some of the code that Claude produces, its Readmes suck)

Jokes aside, this seems like a really wierd thing to leave to agents; I'm sure its definitely useful but how exactly is this more secure, a bad actor could just prompt inject claude (an issue I'm not sure can ever be fixed with our current model of LLMs).

And surely this is significantly slower than a script, claude can take 10-20 seconds to check the node version; if not longer with human approval for each command, a script could do that in miliseconds.

Sure it could help it work on more environments, but stuff is pretty well standardised and we have containers.

I think this part in the FAQ wraps it up neatly:

""" What about security? Isn't this just curl | bash with extra steps? This is a fair concern. A few things make install.md different:

    Human-readable by design. Users can review the instructions before execution. Unlike obfuscated scripts, the intent is clear.

    Step-by-step approval. LLMs in agentic contexts can be configured to request approval before running commands. Users see each action and can reject it.

    No hidden behavior. install.md describes outcomes in natural language. Malicious intent is harder to hide than in a shell script.

So it is just curl with extra steps; scripts aren't obfuscated, you can read them; if they are obfuscated then they aren't going to use a Install.md and you (the user) should really think thrice before installing.

Step by step approval also sorta betrays the inital bit about leaving installing stuff to ai and wasting time reading instructions.

Malicious intent is harder to hide, but really if you have any doubt in your mind about an authors potential malefeasance you shouldn't be running it, wrapping claude around this doesn't make it any safer really when possible exploits and malware are likely baked into the software you are trying to install, not the install.

tldr; why not just have @grok is this script safe?

Ten more glorious years to installer.sh

So, after teaching people to outsource their reasoning to an LLM, LLMs are now actively coaching folks to use LLMs for tasks for which it makes no sense at all.

This is a "solution" looking for a problem.

I’m not sure this solution is needed with frontier models.

Once you accept that installation will be automated, standardized formats make a lot of sense. Big q is will this particular format, which seems solid, get adopted - probably mostly a timing question

That way we can have entire projects with nothing but Markdown files. And we can run apps with just `claude run app.md`. Who needs silly code anyway?

> Installing software is a task which should be left to AI.

Absolutely I don't think so. This is a very bad idea.

$ curl | bash was bad enough. But $ curl -fsSL | claude looks even worse.

What could possibly go wrong?

What?? How do I get off of this train? I used to come to hacker news for a reason...what the fuck am I reading

Just like installing spice racks is a task which which should be left to military engineer corps.

This is such an insane statement. Is this satire?