Show HN: Double blind entropy using Drand for verifiably fair randomness
8 points
2 hours ago
| 4 comments
| blockrand.net
| HN
The only way to get a trust-less random value is to have it distributed and time-locked three ways, player, server and a future-entropy.

In the demo above, the moment you commit (Roll-Dice) a commit with the hash of a player secret is sent to the server and the server accepts that and sends back the hash of its secret back and the "future" drand round number at which the randomness will resolve. The future used in the demo is 10 secs

When the reveal happens (after drand's particular round) all the secrets are revealed and the random number is generated using "player-seed:server-seed:drand-signature".

All the verification is in Math, so truly trust-less, so:

1. Player-Seed should matches the player-hash committed

2. Server-Seed should matches the server-hash committed

3. Drand-Signature can is publicly not available at the time of commit and is available at the time of reveal. (Time-Locked)

4. Random number generated is deterministic after the event and unknown and unpredictably before the event.

5. No party can influence the final outcome, specially no "last-look" advantange for anyone.

I think this should be used in all games, online lottery/gambling and other systems which want to be fair by design not by trust.

hackingonempty
19 minutes ago
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> The only way to get a trust-less random value is to have it distributed and time-locked three ways, player, server and a future-entropy.

Are you sure? The protocol described in Chuck Norris book Applied Cryptography seems to work fine without a randomness beacon. Once you get the commitments from all parties they reveal the nonces and everyone verifies they match the commitments and extracts the same random bits.

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rishi_blockrand
8 minutes ago
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Great point—Schneier’s two-party protocol is the foundation... However, it suffers from the 'Last-Actor/Last-Look' problem in a client-server environment.

In a standard 2-party commit-reveal, one party always learns the result first. (Mostly servers in current setups).

By adding a Randomness Beacon (Drand) as a third entropy source, we solve two things: No Last-Look: Neither the player nor the server knows the outcome until a specific future timestamp (the Drand round). Forced Resolution: Since the Drand signature is public, once that round passes, the result is 'locked' by math. The server can't hold the result hostage because anyone can pull the Drand signature and verify the result themselves.

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WatchDog
1 hour ago
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Clicking the button sometimes displays an error:

    Error: JSON.parse: unexpected character at line 1 column 1 of the JSON data

Looking at the network tab, the POST request to the commit API returns a 409 error with the message:

    Commitment already pending for Round 26020619. Please wait for settlement before starting a new round.
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rishi_blockrand
1 hour ago
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Oh yes, its only one commitment per call... this is a UI handling issue, will resolve it... the backend by design only takes one commitment per player, till it is resolved/revealed... Thanks
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WatchDog
1 hour ago
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This happened on the first click opening the page, no other commit request in progress from myself, although maybe it's conflicting with other users.
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rishi_blockrand
1 hour ago
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Oh ok... so then thats definitely a bug then... actually drand issues randomness every 3 seconds... so may be multiple on the same drand round has a bug... will correct that... Thanks
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rishi_blockrand
32 minutes ago
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The current time (in the demo) is fixed around 10 secs, but it can be anything, minimum being 6 secs (as the fastest) Drand pulse is 3 second, and some latency buffer...
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charv
1 hour ago
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Cool stuff! I seem to have found a bug — often when I roll, I get this error and no roll happens:

  Error: The string did not match the expected pattern.
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rishi_blockrand
1 hour ago
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Hmm... I have not been able to replicate that... Can u screenshot it ? Thanks for trying it out : )
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