Why doesn't GitHub just enforce immutable versioning for actions? If you don't want immutable releases, you don't get to publish an Action. They could decide to enforce this and mitigate this class of issue.
> We rotated secrets and tokens, but the process wasn't atomic and attackers may have been privy to refreshed tokens
… does anyone know what exactly they're talking about, here? To my knowledge, GH does not divulge new tokens after they're issued, but it depends on the exact auth type we're talking about, and GH has an absurd number of different types of tokens/keys one can use.
So the first incident was on March 19th and the second incident is March 22nd —- evidently the attackers maintained persistence through maybe two separate credential rotation efforts.
Trivy ecosystem supply chain temporarily compromised - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47450142 - March 2026 (35 comments)
Every month the security team wants me to give full code or cloud access to some new scanner they want to trial. They love the fancy dashboards and lengthy reports but if I allowed just 10% of what they wanted we would be pwned on the regular...
Aqua were breached earlier this month, failed to contain it, got breached again last week, failed to contain it again, and now the attackers have breached their Docker Hub account. Shit happens but they're clearly not capable of handling this and should be enlisting outside help.
If you want less self-inflicted damage, stick new scanners in a tight sandbox, feed them read-only miror data, and keep them away from prod perms until they have earned trust with a boring review of exactly what they touch and where the data goes. Otherwise you may as well wire your secrets to a public pastebin and call it testing.
Yet many of these tools have setup like: create a service account, give it about thousand permissions (if not outright full ownership) and send us the JSON private key.
At least they make the red flag nice and obvious.
Compromising all code in one directory is bad. Compromising all my data in all other directories, including mounted cloud drives, is worse.
I restrict most dev tools to access only the current directory.
So, stealing credentials in the current directory and in all other directories are the same thing?