Show HN: PanicLock – Close your MacBook lid disable TouchID –> password unlock
93 points
5 hours ago
| 11 comments
| github.com
| HN
quicklywilliam
4 hours ago
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Great idea and implementation! If you are hesitant to install this for any reason, you can accomplish the same thing with this one liner:

  sudo bioutil -ws -u 0; sleep 1; sudo bioutil -ws -u 1
Edit: here's a shortcut to run the above and then lock your screen. You can give it a global keyboard shortcut in the Shortcuts app. https://www.icloud.com/shortcuts/9362945d839140dbbf987e5bce9...
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alin23
2 hours ago
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Hook this to a lid angle below 30° trigger in https://lowtechguys.com/crank and you can easily make it run on a simple lowering of the lid
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mrdomino-
4 hours ago
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Neat idea.

I remember way back in the day, there was some question as to the legality of compelled unlocking of devices; IIRC, it’s been deemed legal to compel a fingerprint, but illegal (under the first amendment?) to compel entry of a password—IIRC, as long as that password hasn’t been written down anywhere.

I gather this is written to that end primarily? Or is there some other goal as well?

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seanieb
4 hours ago
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I wrote this after the case of a Washington Post reporter, Hannah Natanson, was compelled to unlock her computer with her fingerprint. This resulted in access to her Desktop Signal on her computer, revealing sources and their conversations.

https://www.yahoo.com/news/articles/washington-post-raid-pro...

Edit: I've a lot more details about the legality and precedence on the apps landing page https://paniclock.github.io/

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mrdomino-
3 hours ago
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Cool, thank you.
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420official
2 hours ago
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While it's true that the legality of law enforcement forcing passwords in unclear, courts can absolutely force you to enter a password even if it's not written down by holding you in contempt indefinitely.
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xoa
1 hour ago
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>courts can absolutely force you to enter a password even if it's not written down by holding you in contempt indefinitely.

This is not true outside of a narrow exception. Indeed this is the core point of the 5th Amendment, to protect you from having to be witness against yourself. It's just as binding on the judicial branch as it is on the executive. Ordinarily, a court may not compel a defendant to testify or say something that could incriminate them.

The narrow exception is the "foregone conclusion doctrine", which allows compelling testimony about specific evidence the government legally knows exists, knows the defendant controls access to, and knows is authentic. All of which has a bunch of caselaw around it. The textbook example is somebody has a device open, and an officer directly witnesses illegal material on it, but before they can seize it the person manages to turn it off and now it cannot be accessed without a password. So the government can say "we witnessed this specific illegal material, and this device is owned by the defendant and we can prove from video that they have accessed the device, and we want access to that specific material". But if you're just crossing the border with a locked device, they cannot compel the password just to search through it, or even if they're suspicious of something specific. They need actual knowledge, either through their own evidence or because the person foolishly talks and confesses something.

Otherwise they can definitely physically seize the device for a time (which could be very inconvenient/expensive depending) but that's it.

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xoxxala
4 hours ago
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The website has some more info on the biometric vs. password debate and legal situation:

https://paniclock.github.io/

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whalesalad
2 hours ago
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Take it to the logical end - you can tie up / handcuff / sedate / restrain an individual in order to get their fingerprint (or, ahem, way worse) but you cannot extract a password from someones brain.
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vunderba
1 hour ago
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> cannot extract a password from someones brain.

May I introduce you to XKCD Number 538.

https://xkcd.com/538

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stavros
2 hours ago
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If it's in scope to "way worse" someone to get their fingerprint, I'm sure I can be very persuasive in getting their passwords.
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whalesalad
59 minutes ago
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You can get the fingerprint of a dead person... you cannot extract a password from a dead person.
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stavros
56 minutes ago
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Of course not. You extract it right before.
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freehorse
2 hours ago
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This is great. I see many times "security advice" against biometrics replacing password unlock, but most of the time I am more worried about getting recorded by somebody/something while typing a password in the open than anything else. This makes it better for those other cases.
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wolvoleo
52 minutes ago
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I'm surprised Apple doesn't offer an option. On the iPhone you could do this by pressing the power button several times. Not sure if this still works because the iPhone 6 was my last one though.
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bhj
17 minutes ago
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Pressing and holding Power + Vol Up/Down is the current combo
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rglover
41 minutes ago
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This is awesome, thank you. Was just thinking about this problem the other day. Glad someone whipped something up.
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gruturo
1 hour ago
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This would be perfect if it could monitor the force with which the lid is closed (macs have accelerometers after all, either this info or an acceptable proxy could be derived?).

Gently close? no action.

Stronger, faster action? Disable touch ID

Slam shut in full panic? yeah disable all biometrics, lose all state, even wipe the ram and the filevault key if it's an option

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thih9
46 minutes ago
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Perfect rage quitting machine. There should be an enterprise version: when lid is closed with full force it also sends a professional resignation letter to the current employer.
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QuercusMax
51 minutes ago
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You must not have cats or children if you think that last one is reasonable
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gruturo
31 minutes ago
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Ok just unload the filevault key from ram, better? And if possible tell the secure enclave to revert to the before-first-unlock state
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p0w3n3d
4 hours ago
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What's the rationale? It should be described in the README.md IMO
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seanieb
4 hours ago
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That's good feedback. I just added it to the readme:

> "PanicLock fills a gap macOS leaves open: there is no built-in way to instantly disable Touch ID when it matters. Biometrics are convenient day-to-day, and sometimes preferable when you need speed or want to avoid your password being observed. But in sensitive situations, law enforcement and border agents in many countries can compel a biometric unlock in ways they cannot with a password. PanicLock gives you a one-click menu bar button, a customizable hotkey, or an automatic lock-on-lid-close option that immediately disables Touch ID and locks your screen, restoring password-only protection without killing your session or shutting down."

I've more details on the apps landing page - paniclock.github.io

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itsdesmond
4 hours ago
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A person might use it to stop someone getting into your computer through certain types of physical coercion, forcing your finger to the reader, or (much less likely but I’m sure security services know how) a copy of your fingerprint.

But it isn’t a why, it is a what. That what is a tool that lets you quickly disable Touch ID for whatever reason you want to.

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ttul
4 hours ago
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The 2026 version of "Boss Key".
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nailer
48 minutes ago
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If someone can force you to use touch id they can probably also force you to enter your password.

(If you’re about to comment about fingerprints on transparency film and balloons filled with warm water then yes good point)

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Forgeties79
4 hours ago
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PSA to iOS users: if you tap the lock button 5x it forces password-only unlocking. Useful at protests or any precarious situations with law enforcement.
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jonpalmisc
2 hours ago
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This still leaves your device in an AFU (after first unlock) state, with user data decrypted, and should not be treated as secure.

The only thing you can do (to protect your data from forensics, etc) is to return it to BFU by shutting it off.

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seanieb
2 hours ago
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Correct. This is a classic security vs convenience tradeoff. I mention that trade off on the landing page, PanicLock vs Shutdown

> Use shutdown when you can, PanicLock when you can't. Shutting down is the most secure option—but when you need your Mac locked now and you'll be back in five minutes, PanicLock is your answer.

*PanicLock* - Fast "oh shit" button - Lid closed when in transit. - Instant lock (1 second). Disables Touch ID immediately - Preserves your session - Back to work in minutes

*Full Shutdown* - Maximum security - Purges encryption keys - Fully locks FileVault - Takes time to shutdown & restart - Kills your session

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Forgeties79
2 hours ago
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Better than nothing and keeps them from having unlocked access. You can do it fast in your pocket.
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chuckadams
4 hours ago
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Bringing up the shutdown screen (hold lock and either volume button) will also do it.
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itsdesmond
4 hours ago
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I did not know that. That is extremely convenient. Thank you.
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freehorse
2 hours ago
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Tapping it 5 (6? 7? 20?) times works better while panicked, though.
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sigio
3 hours ago
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On GrapheneOS (and maybe android generic?) this calls the emergency number, I just found out (with a 5 second timer to cancel this luckily)
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orthogonal_cube
3 hours ago
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Honestly I’m surprised this wasn’t already a feature in macOS. Thank you for coding it and publishing as open-source!
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