Encryption for me not for thee?
It's only afterwards and as a consequence some highly newsworthy disasters occur such as a child abduction or political sex scandal involving a high profile politician come to light that the lay public will get the message that weak encryption is effectively no encryption.
In the meantime criminals will be early adopters of more sophisticated messaging such as steganography.
"If user = foo, then send the on device keys elsewhere"?
Or if those keys are part of a TPM, then a software update that just asks it to send in the decrypted messages?
Can judges not order this now, but can order decryption if the keys are stored centrally?
What makes you think French citizens don’t care?
Prop 13 in California is an amazing example of this, known as a third rail political issue because it "kills" the politicians who attack it directly. It doesn't even approach even getting put up as a proposition or bill directly. It has a tight feedback loop because the most mobilized voting class, the olds, feel it immediately and the Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association mobilizes immediately also. So they go for it on the sides, for things like commercial property, or complicated to understand inheritance and so on.
So if you really want to fight back and be effective, you have to (politically) destroy the careers of those who do.
Governments should probably adopt some sort of "retry" limit for these things. Good luck getting that passed though I suppose.
What, did you think right and left were arbitrary? The words are arbitrary, but the meanings are not. They correlate quite strongly with the material interests of the up and down.
Unless you literally belive everyone in the EU belive the exact same thing and there's zero disagreements what do ever.
Few are, that is a huge part of it. Most have far more pressing concerns.
Telegram doesn't even try to be end-to-end-encrypted by default. WhatsApp claims to be end-to-end-encrypted, but it's not open-source, Signal is end-to-end-encrypted.
I sent some people a password reset through them but half of them couldn't get their head around it.
So yeah while it has secret chats, they aren't very useful at all.
And explicitly does not encrypt metadata.
Meanwhile NSA top brass publicly stated, "We kill people based on metadata."
Does make you wonder what kind of people they kill or how many. I can't think of a lot of crimes whose metadata warrants being killed for personally.
You're (literally) missing links then. If A is a high-value target that we look at closely (because they're a high-value target), what if B frequently contacts A? If C, D, and E always recieve messages from B immediately following A messaging B?
What about times? Is B messaging F at a consistant time, and never outside of that? Is A only messaging G, at a set time, with G's phone immediately being put into (ineffective) airplane mode immediately before and after?
Facebook built their business on the social graph, but the CIA's been at this for decades
so as i read it the article doesn't suggest that all of telegram is end-to-end encrypted only that it has support for it.
Let's start putting some of these politicians in jail for being stupid.
But on the other side what I miss is some explanation if forensic analysis helps here? Presumably the messages stay on a phone and you can recover them. If that is the case then it should be enough to fight the crime, i.e if you get a warrant to access the device then you can access messages, which I believe many would agree is fine.
So a person in Canada messages someone in France who's WhatsApp is not encrypted. But the message from Canada is encrypted. Will the person in Canada's message have to be sent unencrypted ? Or will WhatsApp Canada need to allow France to break Canada's encryption ?
Personally I think it would be easier for these apps to ban people in France from using their service.
> "Perrin now offers a different framing. “Article 8 ter, which I had adopted, was not at all aimed at obtaining encryption keys but at introducing a ghost participant into a conversation before encryption,” he says. The “ghost participant” approach, sometimes called a ghost user proposal, was floated by GCHQ in 2018 and rejected by every major privacy organization, civil liberties group, and security researcher who looked at it. The idea is that the platform silently adds a third recipient, an invisible intelligence agent, to a supposedly two-person conversation. Users never see them. The encryption technically still works, except that one of the parties is the state."
French investigators won't care about every WhatsApp message. But they definitely will slurp them all up, process them all with AI, and read them whenever they have an interest. And they will deny they are doing this as they do this.
It'd be interesting (horrifying?) to see something that was once assumed secret go public. Imagine if all chats and payments eventually went public at some point... the Transparity, when nothing can be encrypted anymore so no one tries. Mankind becomes a unit.
With TON, perhaps altcoins will give way to micro coins - tailored especially for apps and their users/founders? ..for micropayments and running on AI infrastructure. Blockchain and AI infrastructure are already interchangeable in large part. So if transaction histories are exposed, the damage is limited. Startups won't look to IPO, they'll look to float a coin to make serious money. Binance did it. Polymarket next? Poly is dominated by Bitcoin as it stands.
I'm not sure if Ethereum tokens would be the same thing.
I strongly suspect instead that you would see Polymarket-style insider trading by the few powerful people who have access to the secrets.
https://community.qbix.com/t/the-global-war-on-end-to-end-en...
And by the way, this article mentions other things already in place, such as being able to commandeer your device and spy on it without breaking encryption:
https://community.qbix.com/t/increasing-state-of-surveillanc...