As a security person it is tiring to see so many people here either directly claim or at least allude to the claim that this is somehow much less scary because the _published_ exploit does not bypass ASLR. The writeup claims there is a way to reliably bypass ASLR with this attack. And that is a good default assumption I would be willing to believe without evidence.

ASLR is a defense-in-depth technique intended to make exploitation more difficult. In almost all cases it is only a matter of time and skill to also include an ASLR bypass. Both requirements continue being lowered by LLM agents every few weeks. It is only a matter of time (and probably not a lot of time) until a fully weaponized exploit is developed. It may be published, it may also be kept private.

It is straight up wrong to say "if you have ASLR enabled, you're not at any risk from this" and saying this is extremely harmful for anyone that trusts claims like that.

This wrong belief that you shouldn't care about security vulnerabilities because mitigations may make exploitation more difficult has already caused so much harm in the past. Be glad that modern mitigations exist, but patch your stuff asap. If you are a vendor, do not treat vulnerability reports as invalid because the researcher has not provided an ASLR bypass. Fix the root cause and hope mitigations buy you enough time to patch before you get owned.

This one's pretty bad but there are some preconditions.

Requires a "rewrite" directive with a questionmark in the replacement string, and then a subsequent "set" directive that references a regex capture group (e.g. set $var $1).

Also the POC assumes ASLR is disabled.

The official F5 page is here: https://my.f5.com/manage/s/article/K000161019

As noted elsewhere, ASLR protects you. While you are waiting for your affected platform to get the fix, they note the mitigation:

"use named captures instead of unnamed captures in rewrite definition"

"To mitigate this vulnerability for this example, replace $1 and $2 with the appropriate named captures, $user_id and $section"

F5 patched 1.31.0 and 1.30.1.

OpenResty has a patch for 1.27 and 1.29: https://github.com/openresty/openresty/commit/ee60fb9cf645c9...

You can track OpenResty's (a Lua application server based on Nginx) progress here: https://github.com/openresty/openresty/issues/1119

The POC disables aslr: https://github.com/DepthFirstDisclosures/Nginx-Rift/blob/mai...

Is there a good alternative to Apache and Nginx that's written in a memory safe language and not full of security holes? I briefly looked at Jetty (written in Java) and Caddy (written in Go) but they seem to have a history of vulnerabilities of other types (e.g. shell injection in Jetty) so I'm not sure they would be any better.

Looks into the CVE, ah an heap memory corruption, business as usual.

Does Debian 12 have this patched? But I guess I'm not affected if I don't use `rewrite` or `set` anywhere?

Better links:

https://depthfirst.com/research/nginx-rift-achieving-nginx-r... (https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=48126029)

https://depthfirst.com/nginx-rift (https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=48123365)

tl;dr If you don't use ngx_http_rewrite_module, you're fine

Honestly it's such a weird feature, if you're doing complicated redirects like this in nginx where PCRE is necessary, you should do it in your application code. And if you need speed use ngx_http_lua_module.

Just saw this pop up — full public PoC for CVE-2026-42945 ("NGINX Rift"), a heap buffer overflow in NGINX's ngx_http_rewrite_module that's been there since 0.6.27 (2008).

It triggers on a very common pattern: a `rewrite` directive (with an unnamed capture like $1/$2 and a `?` in the replacement string) followed by `set`, `if`, or another `rewrite`. The root cause is a classic two-pass script engine bug (length calculation vs. actual copy pass with ngx_escape_uri).

The PoC turns it into unauthenticated RCE using cross-request heap feng shui + pool cleanup pointer corruption. Tested with a simple Docker setup.

- Repo + Python exploit: https://github.com/DepthFirstDisclosures/Nginx-Rift - Full technical write-up: https://depthfirst.com/research/nginx-rift-achieving-nginx-r... - F5 advisory + patches (1.31.0 / 1.30.1 for OSS, plus Plus updates): https://my.f5.com/manage/s/article/K000160932 (or the latest K000161019)

Affects basically any NGINX doing URL rewriting in front of apps/PHP/etc. Workaround mentioned is switching to named captures.

The discovery angle is also interesting — it was found autonomously by depthfirst's security analysis tool after one-click onboarding of the NGINX source.

Anyone running NGINX in production using rewrite rules? How are you checking your configs? Thoughts on the exploit chain or the AI-assisted finding process?

Crap

Wow, coming from the webdev world. It is so funny seeing NGINX, one of the widest used web servers in the world, on version 1.x. React is on version 19. Really shows how differently new vs. old software is designed and built, and not necessarily in a good way.

https://world.hey.com/dhh/finished-software-8ee43637 https://josem.co/the-beauty-of-finished-software/