I agree, but it's the people I'm worried about.
I'm hearing anecdotes from all over about devs pushing LLM-generated code changes into production without retaining any knowledge of what it is they're pushing. The changes compound, their understanding of the codebase diminishes, and so the actions become risker.
What's worse is a lot of this behavior is being driven by leaders, whether directly (e.g. unrealistic velocity goals, promoting people based on hand-wavy "use AI" initiatives, etc) or indirectly (e.g. layoffs overloading remaining devs, putting inexperienced devs in senior rolls, etc).
The world's gone mad and large swaths of the industry seem hellbent on rediscovering the security basics the hard way.
I mean we are literally in a thread about how the 4 trillion dollar company, literally the 3rd most valuable company in the world, with a core competency in software has, yet again, released a core product riddled with security defects for the 50th year in a row.
Commercial IT security is a industry that is incapable to a fault and has, so far, faced basically zero consequences for it.
So much out of date software with known exploits left running for years. The only reason there hasn't been total disaster is no one has tried to hack it yet.
Arm published the Memory Tagging Extension (MTE) specification in 2019 as a tool for hardware to help find memory corruption bugs. MTE is a memory tagging and tag-checking system, where every memory allocation is tagged with a secret. The hardware guarantees that later requests to access memory are granted only if the request contains the correct secret. If the secrets don’t match, the app crashes, and the event is logged. This allows developers to identify memory corruption bugs immediately as they occur.
https://support.apple.com/guide/security/operating-system-in...
(https://www.usenix.org/publications/loginonline/data-only-at...)
This makes more sense. You don't trigger MTE since you're not doing anything for force MTE to take action the program isn't actually changing.
My other question would be, why didn't apple use fbounds checking here? They've been doing it aggressively everywhere else.
MTE plus fbounds checking everywhere should lead to an extremly hardened OS
1. it’s to performance sensitive
Or
2. The os is so darn large it’s hard to recompile everything
Its not the first time bugs get past MTE, happened with Google Pixel last year ... https://github.blog/security/vulnerability-research/bypassin...
They simply have to show it against a beta version of MacOS, and frame it as unauthorized access, and maybe from locked mode if possible
https://daniel.haxx.se/blog/2026/05/11/mythos-finds-a-curl-v...