> It's a different kind of tool doing a different kind of work, and that makes a clean apples-to-apples comparison to earlier models difficult.
They claim it’s a different kind of tool and then describe using it the same way you’d use any other model. This really felt way worse than the average Cloudflare blog and really just rehashed the Mythos announcement which had already called out the key parts being chaining and crafting examples.
Hah, I was trying to parse this too.
Charitably perhaps they're being vague on exactly what's different because they're still under NDA.
How long has it been since you took your average? Lately all Cloudflare output has been heavily AI'd.
Because of it's capabilities, a new kind of harness can be built for it, thus the entire system (model + harness) is a different kind of tool than say Claude code
[1] https://xbow.com/blog/mythos-offensive-security-xbow-evaluat...
Really this is why the LLM needs to be able to write exploits for issues it finds. Of course that leads down a rabbit hole of other issues. But if an exploit works, then that's pretty conclusive evidence.
Frontier models, including Mythos, can greatly streamline bug hunting and exploit developments in the hands of a competent security engineer. In the hands of a person with no security experience, they will still mostly waste your time and money.
Interesting that gpt-5.5, while not as good as mythos, also seems like a decent step up
> "Why it matters"
It doesn't, it's a corporate blog, they were rarely written in one-author's voice anyway, but it's interesting to see that even large organisations are outsourcing their blogs to LLMs.
I will upgrade the "why it matters" to "and now AI output is part of the training data". A day is coming when the punched-up AI verbiage will be the norm and hard to distinguish unless you're from the previous generation. Sort of in the way that I miss some aspects of Usenet.
I could only follow up with, "that is a genuine insight."
Not a single person visibly flinched in pain.
Seems stifling. We'll need someway to reward human creativity and out-of-bounds thinking before our greatest corpus of human intellect is a bounded by whenever and whatever was trained on.
It's like staring down the barrel of a gun and taking the time to make quips about the type of paper the gun advertisement was printed on.
I can agree that snark probably isn't the type of comment that we generally value or encourage here on Hacker News, but neither is posting blatant advertisements and press releases, but here we are discussing one, so shrug ?
And obviously it's a problem that it's so much cheaper to produce writing without underlying substance, but I think when one of the leading Internet security/infrastructure companies is writing about the leading cybersecurity model, it's excessively flippant to say the writing on top is "the real question"
This is also why Claude Code is full of weird bugs and why their support says that it did refunds when it didn't and so on and so forth.
Over time, I wonder if these models will be able to generate more secure code by default by doing this kind of exploitability testing before ever merging their code.
* they, I mean all foundation models providers, as OpenAI seems to go in the same direction
But, I did think the adversarial review (while not novel at all and talked about much in HN circles) is interesting and distinct, at least. I need to put this to work in more of workflows. I think it could be beneficial for non-coding tasks, too.
https://blog.cloudflare.com/cyber-frontier-models/#what-a-ha...
Lots of people feel that Mythos is a psyops campaign, but I don’t really understand the skepticism. Most of it seems to stem from the general distrust of things that aren’t publicly available.
A few Anthropic employees have described Mythos as a general purpose model improvement, but that claim has yet to be widely backed up so that’s the only place I’m remaining skeptical.
For the domain of security research, I’m willing to buy the narrative.
To be fair, they can't say "You know, Mythos is better, but improvements are overhyped af". Moreover, their explanation of that "step change" is strange. It sounds like Mythos isn't that much better at finding vulnerabilities (which is very strange, given statements from Mozilla), but is way stronger at working with them.
> Lots of people feel that Mythos is a psyops campaign, but I don’t really understand the skepticism. Most of it seems to stem from the general distrust of things that aren’t publicly available.
1) Attempts to spin the idea about "Super powerful general purpose model that can't be released for some not so clear reasons" are usually a very bad sign. OpenAI proves it.
2) Mythos system card has a lot of strange moments, errors and things that sound like attempts to deceive.
3) It's strange that Anthropic is struggling with both Sonnet 5.0 and Opus 5.0, but at the same time has a breakthrough in the form of Mythos.
> A few Anthropic employees have described Mythos as a general purpose model improvement, but that claim has yet to be widely backed up so that’s the only place I’m remaining skeptical.
Article describes Mythos as a cybersecurity-specific model though. It's yet another unclear moment.
Honest question, do you buy the narrative of everyone trying to sell you a product?
That's great and all, but nobody was being skeptical or asking anything about whether Mythos is or isn't a step function. Mythos could be a ten-dimensional ladder and it wouldn't change my question. The question wasn't about Mythos, but about Cloudflare: what did they found? That question is entirely fair and expected regardless of whether vulnerabilities are found via Mythos, the NSA, or a caveman.
Right now, many of these vulns are identifiable by Opus, but they still require a human-in-the-loop (and often a skilled one) to guide towards complex exploits. Without a human in the loop, this means it's a lot easy for the average person to identify and leverage an exploit.
I get that you want to address them or whatever before releasing info but I keep seeing these claims with barely any data and I’m like…how do you expect people to not be skeptical?
I mean hell if you’re a security professional you’re literally paid to be skeptical.
https://daniel.haxx.se/blog/2026/05/11/mythos-finds-a-curl-v...
I think this statement seems to align with some of the other independent tests of Mythos[1]. It did very well on long agentic work which I expect is what they trained it for, and that requires being able to find these tangential links between loosely related topics in the context window.
[1] I'm mainly referring to https://www.aisi.gov.uk/blog/our-evaluation-of-claude-mythos...
Claude Code's harness is remarkable for many use cases, particularly with 1M context sizes. But it's also limited when the scale of code or data to read becomes close to that, or exceeds it. The idea that a cluster of actors can work on a shared, structured set of context snippets, and have guidance around what is relevant to them, is an incredibly useful model outside of cybersecurity as well.
So nothing new then.
I have been encouraging people to think about agentic coding in the same way.
Let agents do the reading and writing and inspections. Human does the thinking.
Asking an agent that is looking at a firearm specification schematic "what is wrong with this?" and the response is "this thing contains an explosion and can kill". Human "that's the function" when the human should be asking "based upon the materials used, are the fault tolerances sufficient to maintain structural integrity".
I expressed some concerns along the same lines in the thread about the Mythos evaluation curl did a few days ago, which sounded a lot like the "passing in the repo and telling it go!" type workflow described in this as dramatically less effective.
Disappointed that the post is very slim on details beyond this however. No hard numbers. Not comparatively, not in isolation. Would have arguably been kinda the point.
I don't think guardrails are useful long term. Assuming we don't see the end of open near-frontier models, it is folly to try to keep models from doing exploit generation. The solution needs to be all software projects writing code under the assumption that hackers will be running LLMs against their code in search of exploits and write secure code accordingly.
but I agree that guardrails will only help for like, 3-6 months. we should be screening as much as we can with Mythos; unfortunately, Anthropic is only giving access to the big players.
I’m a security researcher
“Oh in that case”
I think the curl folks finding it underwhelming is more of a testament to their code being subjected to a lot of tests/attacks/auditing over the past years compared to many other codebases. It's not going to find magically insurmounable exploits on it's own and "pwn teh w0rld".
At the same time, there is so much shitty non-memory safe code out there (C/C++ mainly) or logically weak code (much of it vibe-coded or otherwise by inexperienced devs) that will be easy pickings for anyone pointing Mythos at those codebases/services and eventually lead to chaos since the cost of an customized exploit has gone from days to months of expensive researcher time to some token spending.
Now if they noticed that they could find exploit chains easily in a lot of popular software, some embargo and hardening to give popular OSS packages time to not be exploitable by default does help people (and the NSA that probably has a preview).
"We saw consistently more false positives from projects written in memory-unsafe languages."
So while there may be a greater probability to find bugs in C/C++ projects, there is also a greater probability that there will be more work that must be done by humans to verify that real bugs have been found.
Static scanners are ok at find a few particular types of issues, and really bad at more abstract issues. Also having rules where you must pass static analysis has to be followed up with actually making sure your code monkeys aren't writing bullshit that confuses the scanner and lets it pass while doing nothing for security (or adding nice logic traps).
Most external security firms looking at code are more useless than a zero with the circle rubbed out. Had a fun example from a while back where the team that wrote the code inserted an intentional security flaw to be sure they were catching anything. Problem is they were giving access to the entire git history so these stood out. The moment they just gave flat code the security teams ability to find flaws disappeared.
LLM models seem to have a pretty good grasp on finding flaws in code like this once you can get the issue to stay in context and execution time. When I hear things like Mythos getting much longer time to work on the problem then at least to me it makes a lot more sense on the number of issues it's picking up.