Korean weapons systems are 40-60% cheaper than their American counterparts.
The Korean K9 Thunder 155mm self-propelled howitzer costs $3.5 to $4 million per unit. For comparison, the American M109A7 Paladin costs around $8 million. The German PzH 2000 runs approximately $7 to $8 million.
The K239 Chunmoo Rocket Artillery (MLRS) system runs $2.0M/unit; M142 HIMARS runs $4.5M/unit. 155mm artillery shells are $2k/shell from Korea vs $3.5k/shell from the United States. Korean Cheongung II SAM interceptors cost ~$1.1M/unit, US Patriot missiles cost $4.0M/unit.
Buying South Korean weapons systems means you can procure twice as much at the same cost. It's a no brainer why Korea is winning military contracts.
[0] https://militarymachine.com/k9-thunder-howitzer-most-exporte...
Flip-side of cost is effectiveness, and it would be interesting to see real-world data on the accuracy, reliability, and longevity of Korean weapons systems in active combat. I suspect the Koreans are also anxious to see this given their own geopolitical situation and northern neighbour. The article doesn't go here either.
It does, correctly IMO, focus on the reliability of the US as arms supplier, given the increasing control over access as a political weapon of retribution and reward, potential "kill switches" in US arms, the limited total production capacity of the US, and particularly in light of the latter, stocks depletion and unavailability on the basis of capricious gallivanting into ill-conceived conflicts with little gain if not actually worsening its subsequent position, strength, and status.
The Koreas both have an extensive reliance on artillery. Seoul is within range of PRK batteries, Pyonyang not so much from ROK, but any invading forces would be. I suspect ROK counterartillery systems are well developed, and that given the effectiveness of drones in recent years and the likelihood PRK might rely on these that there are, or soon will be, effective countermeasures against them.
Antiballistic missile systems would also be useful for ROK. I know nothing of this, but find that there is a Wikipedia article on the topic: <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Korean_Air_and_Missile_Defense>.
The REAL significant factor is that Korean arms companies are not just sealing weapons, but also willing to sell IP to their allies for you to manufacture their weapons domestically, something very rare in the arms business.
It's why Poland chose to license and manufacture Korean weapons domestically rather than buy superior weapon systems from their EU and NATO allies and neighbors France and Germany, since those two typically only sell weapons but never IP, as they see IP as valuable trade secrets and leverage.
Sovereign supply chain and manufacturing for arms is more important for your national security than price and having the most bleeding edge systems if those imported systems can be withheld against you if your ally wants to squeeze something out of you at some point in the future over petty political squabbles, and Poland has less chances of having beef with Korea on the other side of the planet than with neighboring France and Germany. So it's the most sane decision politically. A lot of countries got bit by this dependence that it's a valuable lesson every country should heethe.
Add in the US's latest antics about controlling the use of they weapons they sell, and in addition trying to bully and demean allies, and it's a mystery as to why anybody would ever use US suppliers these days.
If the US or Germany get in situation they need thousands of those - I guess their cost will fall to under 1M.
I always thought of arms procurement as a tedious and slow process but the Polish/Korean agreements have turned that on its head in my eyes.
Simultaneously supplying new tanks, artillery, and munitions, while quickly standing up local factories to build them in Poland too is impressive, undoubtedly giving the Polish government some well needed breathing room.
Given that the technical package is included here, there must be some form of non-competition clause
Of late the Iran war showed that South Korea's anti-air as well as Biho class armor vehicles engaged drones well in UAE leading them to "we'll send you all we have now and you can pay us later" have won major trust from the region
Unlike China and Russias own weaponry which have largely been proven as duds, Korean weapons are giving American manufacturers a run for their money and if Korea can pull off the middle east region, it would not only secure oil directly while bypassing US dollar settlement, it could establish a sort of oil-for-korean-weapons and perhaps even soldiers in the near future, I think that this is the particular threat that America sees from its own ally and there will likely be some efforts to curb or limit South Korea as this article I think is starting to set the tone for.
I disagree with that. The Korean defense manufacturers like Hanwha work hard to also build production capacity within the US and share or license IP from American firms (eg. Boramae and GE Aviation plus Lockheed Martin).
SK's industry will continue to coexist and thrive with a US partnership similar to how the Israeli defense industry built linkages with the American ecosystem (eg. Elbit).
It also helps that Korean defense companies being part of larger chaebols like Hanwha are able to link defense production contracts with other industrial deals (eg. battery and renewable tech in Hanwha's case).
Even if you are clueless about the international arms trade - South Korea has maintained a huge military for the past 70-ish years, as part of their endless cold war with North Korea. And South Korea has been really big on manufacturing and exporting all sorts of stuff for the past half-ish-century. Why the hell wouldn't they be selling the military things that they are building anyway, at scale, to any and every non-enemy with money to spend?
HN mods chose to employ my suggested title, which follows from HN guidelines and practices: <https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=32949870> and <https://news.ycombinator.com/newsguidelines.html>, most of the first six 'graphs following "In Submissions" pertaining to titles.
So there is an element of surprise. Maybe not as large as North Korea exporting ballistic missiles to Russia [1], but still.
[1]: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/apr/25/how-north-kore...
HN guidelines typically prefer sourcing a title from the text of the document itself. Given Politico seem to be rotating through clickbait variants (the presently displayed title is "Trump Is Tired of Arming Allies. This Country Is Stepping Up.", the submitted title appears elsewhere in the page source), I'd suggest:
"The rise of South Korea’s weapons business"
Which is non-clickbaity, succinct, clear, and accurate. It appears at the start of the 4th body 'graph.
I'd argue it's superior to the subtitle "The U.S. retreat from the global stage is an opportunity for South Korea.", as that option fails to indicate the nature of that opportunity. South Korea and arms trade are the key elements discussed.
The best endorsement for a weapons manufacturer is winning a war against a tough opponent.
Ukraine is the odd one out in that it has developed significant technological capabilities, largely with drones and anti-drone defences, and has active buyers for that tech.
Which makes the US refusal to interact with, learn from, or adopt Ukrainian tech all the more frustrating. There are 13 US fighters that would likely still be alive today, if the current US establishment was t so irrational in their hate of Ukraine, and had adopted anti drove tactics common in Ukraine, including the P1-SUN interceptors that could have taken out the shaheds. Losing an AWACS is an embarrassment beyond words, honestly. Best thing would not have been to start a stupid unwinnable war without any clear objectives.
Iran's successes in the 2025 and 2026 conflicts would be within that premise.
Prior to 2025, and dating back to the mid-1980s, Iran and Israel have been engaged in a proxy conflict, but that also differs from the premise. In large part that's relied on the ability to inflict some pain on counterparties, but not necessarily by exhibiting technological superiority, and not to decisive effect on the part of either Iran or Israel for that matter. See: <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iran%E2%80%93Israel_proxy_conf...>.
Rational thought processes and the current US administration aren't even worth mention, though I'll suggest that the failure of what were once thought to be at least partially resistant institutions such as the military establishment against executive idiocy is especially disheartening.
Only one-way attack drones which are the lowest tech type of drones. ISR drones are much higher on the tech tree, and Iran aren't in the FPV drone game due to a lack of need for them.
That having been said, I couldn't agree more with your frustration around refusing to collaborate with and learn from Ukraine when it comes to Shaheds.
This war with Iran is not really an endorsement of Iranian weapons. The US didn’t stop its offensive because of Iranian weapons. We already knew the effectiveness of one way attack drones just from looking at their employment in Ukraine.
The US counter-UAV industry might start seeing some exponential growth. There’s a lot of lessons learned for the US and we’ll probably start seeing a lot more money thrown around by the US military.
Strong counter-UAV defense requires an entire integrated low-altitude air defense systems. The US systems the Gulf states have purchased are high-altitude oriented, useful against incoming aircraft and some missiles. They have long range radars, but not enough of them in the right places for finding low-flying drones. They have expensive missiles like the Patriot, which works against drones if there are not many of them. There are many incoming drones. Ukraine alone is up to 7 million drones a year.
Aerial warfare is changing in a big way. It's starting to look as big as the transition from battleships. Big airfields are big, fat targets.
[1] https://www.thedefensenews.com/UAE-Qatar-and-Kuwait-Seek-Tho...
I would say they did. Gulf countries ran out of missile and drone defenses and a lot of infrastructure was getting hit. Long run loss of capacity here would be worse than temporary strait closure and there were a lot of assets left to hit.
"The U.S. military reverse-engineered Iran’s Shahed-136 loitering munition to create a low-cost, one-way attack drone squadron in the Middle East called LUCAS (Low-Cost Unmanned Combat Attack System)."
Necessity is the mother of invention. We spent billions in exchange for making our "enemies" stronger. We really are a ridiculous nation.